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BAR BRIEFS
either in the business world or any other of the many activities of life,
has worked out a 100 per cent formula for the American people to
follow.
In this American life of ours, we have many religions, and it is a
great truth that our Constitution does not recognize a state religion,
but leaves to all our people the right to worship God Almighty according
to the dictates of his own conscience. What a sound doctrine that is.
It is written in our fundamental law and in the constitutions of the
different states of the Union, but not all our people follow the great
fact laid down in our Constitution some years ago.
In this state we have had our share of dissenting opinions by the
Supreme Court. I am not aware of any decision where a dissent has
been later adopted by the Supreme Court as the law of the state.
All over the land there is a great growing interest as to our courts.
A good judge is a valuable asset to any community; a poor judge is an
awful liability. On the whole, we have been quite fortunate in having
honest, upright, far-reaching judges on the bench, and it is becoming
general throughout the country that when, either by appointment or by
election, a good judge is found and elevated to the bench-the very
highest of our positions in this country-that it is good, hard common
sense to keep such a judge in the public service.
M. A. HILDRETH, President,
State Bar Association.
SOME QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE APPLICATION
OF THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" DOCTRINE
By

DEXTER MERRIAM KEEZER

In 1876, the United States Supreme Court, in the now famous case
of Munn v. Illinois, first gave sanction in this country to the doctrine
that an enterprise may become "affected with a public interest," and in
consequence be subject to public regulation. The doctrine has been
steadily expanded, bringing within its scope an increasing range and
diversity of enterprises. There is a basis for the belief that the classification of enterprises held to be "affected with a public interest" will continue to be enlarged. It therefore becomes important to see whether
there is any economic pattern into which such enterprises can be fitted.
The legislatures may pass laws declaring an enterprise to be "affected
with a public interest," and subject to the liabilities which may attach
themselves to that classification; but this is not conclusive, for the
circumstances are always a subject of judicial inquiry.
Chief Justice Taft, in the Wolff Packing Company case, divided
the public interest businesses into three classes; but this classification
is not complete, for it does not include all cases, nor does it exclude cases
that are not clothed with public interest.
Specific ConsiderationsLeading to JudicialApproval of
Regulation in the Public Interest
In Munn v. Illinois the Supreme Court of the United States found
the regulation by the State of Illinois of rates charged by grain elevators
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in Chicago to be a reasonable regulation of enterprise "affected with a

punlic interest;" because the Chicago elevators occupied a strategic
position to take a "virtual monopoly" toll from an important volume of
commerce in agricultural products. The condition which warranted the

regulation of rates seemed to be the fact that a virtual monopoly in an
imp~ortant service did exist, or was seriously threatened.
State regulation of railroads has been sustained on the ground that
the railroads are engaged in a public employment affecting the public
interest and are subject to legislative control by their charters.
Insurance business was held to be "affected with a public interest"
on the ground that insurance so far affects the public welfare as to
invoke and require governmental regulation. Banking business was
also held to be subject to regulation.

In the Wolff Packing Company cases, the Kansas Industrial Court
held that it had the power to regulate the wages paid to the employees
of the meat packing company. But the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the Industrial Court did not have the power to regulate

wages of these employees, on the ground that this industry "was not
affected with a public interest."

It is practically impossible to generalize about characteristics of
"public interest" enterprises. In determining what constitutes a public
use, legislation cannot be depended upon. Precedents are of little avail

for what is today a public use may not be tomorrow, but each case must
be decided upon its facts.-Michigan Law Review.

A UTILITARIAN TEST FOR CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

By

ANDERSON WOODS

The legitimate social reactions to crime are three: (1) direct restraint
of the offender himself from further misdeeds; (2) moral education
of the offender directed toward his reformation, or cure; (3) punishment, with a view to deterrence from crime, not only of the particular
offender, but as well of other persons unlawfully disposed.
Punishment has for its primary end, deterrence. A lawbreaker is
put into prison only if it is desirable to deter him as well as others
through fear of the penalty. "Only the so-called responsible can, under
the law, be punished." One who is not sufficiently subject to deterrence
or intimidation by fear of the penalty so as to overcome his impulse to
act, is irresponsible.
"When punishment is not useful and necessary in the combatting
of evils worse than itself, it is wicked and cruel." Though this view
may be said to do away with a deterrence of others similarly inclined,
in effect it does not; as those individuals know that they are in a class
which would be punished in a like situation; as they are responsible.
One theory is that irresponsibility cannot exist without mental
disease. Legislatures merely specify a disease which takes away the
knowledge of right and wrong. If this knowledge amounts to knowing

